Personalizing an Impersonal Weapon

Integrating Armed UAV's and Ground Forces

Major Jay Adair

13 May 2010

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics



WORKING DRAFT – V3

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Aim

- To provide an overview of the integration of UAVs and ground forces in Kandahar province in 2008 with the view to highlighting best practices

Agenda

- Part 1
  - Kandahar 2008: The Operating Environment
  - The 2 PPCLI Battle Group
- Part 2
  - Integrating UAVs into the Joint Tactical Fight

Bottom Line Up Front

- Operations in Kandahar in 2008 need to be considered under the umbrella of CLEAR
  - We entered the fight with a population-centric mindset but…
- We operated in a “UAV Laboratory” and the lessons learned are applicable across the spectrum
- UAV employment reduces risk of “bad” air strikes
- The key to the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is the “man” – this system is impersonal and needs to be personalized
  - UAV employment supports/complements activities on the ground
- Optimal employment of UAVs demands a nuanced understanding of the environment gained only through interaction with the population on the ground – UAV use is not a panacea for face to face interaction
- UAVs and the potential of UAVs influence the manner in which the enemy fights – this can be leverage to our advantage

Security Summary 2008



- 24% Afghans perceive improvement, 19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)
- 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- 33% increase in Kinetic Events
- IED events up 27%....single largest cause of casualties
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%
- Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*

C Coy 2 VP

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'WE'RE NOT GOING TO WIN THIS WAR'

FABRIZIO BENSCH / REUTERS

Women in burqas walk behind a German army gunner with the International Security Assistance Force in Taloqan, Afghanistan, yesterday. Britain's commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, says the war against the Taliban cannot be won.

Eastern Ontario – Kandahar Province




Kandahar
KAF
KANDAHAR
20 km
KAF

AREA OF OPERATIONS – KANDAHAR CITY

AREA OF OPERATIONS – ZHAREY AND PANJWAYI



TYPICAL PANJAWYI AND ZHAREY TOPOGRAPHY

ZHAREY AND PANJAWYI – FROM THE GROUND

The Kandahar Battlespace



From TFH Briefing Apr 08

BG operated in permissive, semi-permissive, non-permis

Operational Context



The 2 PPCLI Battle Group

Battle Group Organization



The BG Team

- 848 Regular Force Soldiers
- 174 Reserve Force Soldiers

Battle Group Role – Succeeding versus Winning

- **We must focus on the word *succeed* instead of *win* in this campaign**
  - **Success is tied to the will of the Afghan people**

Succeed **– "to make good, thrive prosper, or progress in order to accomplish a favourable aim or outcome"**

Win **– "to acquire, be victorious or triumph as a result of a fight"**

C Coy 2 VP

Battle Group Role

- The Battle Group role is to *SHAPE* the battlespace through lethal and non-lethal action in order to set the security conditions that *ENABLE* successful ANSF action, development and governance initiatives within the AO
  - **The BG "buys time" to allow Afghans to take control**

So What? – Protect the Population, Enable other Organizations

The Objective

The guy between us and the objective

"Ninety percent of the people you call Taliban are actually tribals. They're fighting for loyalty or Pashtun honor, and to profit the tribe. They're not extremists. But they're terrorized by the other 10 percent: religious fanatics, terrorists, people allied to (the Taliban leadership) Quetta. They're afraid if they reconcile, the crazies will kill them. To win them over, first you have to protect their people, prove that the extremists can't hurt them if they come to your side"

Afghan Provincial Governor, 2008

Battle Group Role – Layman's Terms

- Fight in a manner <u>that will allow the war to be won</u>
  - BG role extends far beyond neutralizing insurgents
    - Influence Afghans
      - Convince neutrals to support GIROA
        - » Protect/Isolate from the insurgency and its effects
      - Retain support of those who already support GIROA
        - » Protect from the insurgency and its effects
      - Mentor and facilitate the mentorship of all elements of the GIROA
      - Convince insurgents supporters to support GIROA
        - » Hunt and Kill those who need to be killed

Effects Created by the BG



The Carrot and Stick Approach



COIN as an Argument

A Fight – Talk Proposition

How the BG Operated

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES	PHYSICAL OUTPUT	EFFECTS OUTPUT (messages to TA)
FRAMEWORK OPS		We are here to protect you (the population) with ANSF on behalf of the GIROA.
Responsive, visible, combined force		
TARGETING		We see what goes on in the battlespace and will kill those who fight against the GIROA.
Precision collection – Understand the Environment – Find the enemy		
DELIBERATE OPS		We (the ANSF and ISAF) are stronger than the insurgency and will ultimately prevail.
Combined Deliberate Ops – Fix and Finish		

ACCENTUATE POSITIVES

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

MITIGATE NEGATIVES

Utility of Force at the BG Level

- **Where do we CLEAR?**
- **How do we HOLD what we CLEARED?**
- **What do we BUILD?**



- To ensure the greatest “utility of force” we need to employ the BG in a manner that has the greatest effect (utility) (protect our CoG – attack enemy CoG)
  - “High Pay Off Low Risk”

The Kandahar Battlespace – A Vicious Cycle


2
CF presence attracts insurgents who carry out attacks against CF.
How do we break the cycle?
presence in certain area.
3
Population avoids contact with CF but remain susceptible to insurgent influence.
4
Population moves from area to avoid the coercion from the insurgents and conflict between CF and insurgents. CF increase force protection increase distance from

Clearing demands Holding

Focusing Effort – The Stability Box Concept



3

DISRUPTION AREA
Remainder of AOR. Focus of BG and SOF activity. Aim to disrupt insurgents and degrade their ability to influence in other areas of the Stab Box.

2

HOLD AREA
OMLT main effort. Mission is to protect Stab Box from direct insurgent influence. No development occurs in this area. Focused IO efforts on elders and leaders to gain consent. Criteria for development needs to be established to be eligible for PRT benefits. Once criteria met, BUILD AREA expands into this area.

1

BUILD AREA
Selected where there is support for CF and this support will have disproportionate influence in surrounding area. PRT main effort. Permanently presence. **Must** protect population 24/7. No kinetic

KEY

DISRUPT

HOLD

BUILD

The key to
success…

UAVs in COIN

Alone…an impersonal weapon

One Man's Vision

"We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now that there will be no basis for comparison. Take everything you've learned about aviation in war, throw it out of the window, and let's go to work on tomorrow's aviation. It will be different from anything the world has ever seen."

Gen Hap Arnold, USAAF

VJ Day, 1945

Airpower in COIN

"Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly, we can lose this fight."

General Stan McChrystal
COMISAF
16 June 2009

Another Man's Vision

"We pray to Allah we have American soldiers to kill… but added these bombs from the sky we cannot fight"

Taliban Fighter

Were these people reconcilable?

If all you have
is a hammer,
everything
looks like a nail

STOP DRONE ATTACKS

Countering Asymmetry with Asymmetry

Spectrum of UAV Employment



- Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace
- Target acquisition
- Reconnaissance

- CAS
  - Armed overwatch
  - Air Strike Coordination
  - Direct fire support
  - Dynamic targeting (hunter-killer)
  - Potential for strike

Integrating Air Assets into Ground Operations

- **Operating environment**
  - The enemy relies on concealment “amongst the people”
    - They are hard to find!
  - Striking non combatants is detrimental to campaign objectives
  - Causing collateral damage is detrimental to campaign objectives

Integrating Air Assets into Ground Operations

- **We have complete air dominance…so what? What does the UAV capability provide us?**
- **Asymmetry**
  - Deadly Persistence – maintain tempo when it cannot be achieved solely through ground manoeuvre
    - Allows ground forces to focus on interacting with the population
  - Precision
    - Gain unprecedented insight into the activities and character of our foe (and the population) and the population
    - Must achieve lowest collateral damage as possible
  - Speed and Flexibility
- **Bottom Line**
  - Another manoeuvre element to hunt and kill an elusive and adaptive foe – potentially "high pay-off – low risk"

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Developing and Maintaining key relationships**
  - Relationships reduce friction
  - Personal relationships between commanders/commanders, commanders/staff and various staffs are far more important than any formal *command relationship*
  - We must communicate amongst ourselves but the Air Force needs to provide advice to other elements – especially the Army – they will listen!
  - Debriefing is the norm – this is something we do well!
    - Include other elements in debriefs!
- **Understanding the capabilities of the UAV and other air assets**

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Controlling the asset at the appropriate headquarters**
  - Controlled at the HQ that can shorten the kill chain/response time the most
    - We were relatively flat
      - Common operating picture
      - Unity of command (not control)
  - ROVER is a double-edged sword
    - Default to the commander on the ground
- **Ensuring JTACs and an S2 representative were on duty in the BG TOC**
  - Tracking and striking targets requires patience – the UAV is only as persistent as those operating it

The Power to Decide
The Certainty to Act

TACP

ISR O

S2 Ops

S3

Battle Capt

Recommendation to Commander – Strike/No Strike

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Synchronizing ground and air manoeuvre**
  - Battlefield organization – tactical “deep fight”
  - Ground manoeuvre creates a reaction from the insurgents
  - Armed UAVs unnerve the enemy and force them to make mistakes
- **Establishing procedural controls that shortened engagement times**
- **Establishing common sight picture on the application of ROE**
  - Hostile intent determined by the “guy on the ground”
- **Accepting the Positive Identification (PID) of the enemy reflects the enemy’s adaptive nature and evolves**
  - May mean reasonable certainty not beyond reasonable doubt

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Employing an effective targeting methodology**
  - Determines the most important “things we do everyday”
    - Counterinsurgency Triage
      - Those who cannot be influenced
      - Those who support us
      - Those who can be influenced
    - Answers the question: “Where can we have the greatest impact”?
      - What are intended effects?
        - » How do we achieve those effects?
    - Does not replace detailed operational planning

UAVs can reduce this!

Keys to Successful Integration

- **Employing an effective targeting methodology**
  - Focus on MVTs (people) as the centre of mass
  - Method – complete a series of targeting cycles
    - F3EAD
      - Find – cross-cueing of all sensors
      - Fix – the “unblinking eye”
      - Finish – strike
      - Exploit – face to face cross-talk
        - » **Anyone can drop a bomb…**
        - » **Strikes must be complemented with messages or follow-on action that is understood by Afghans**
      - Analyze – face to face cross-talk – shared analysis
      - Disseminate – info sharing and process refinement

Targeting Framework



The Team

A long road...

Doing the Right Thing… Amidst Chaos

Discussion